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Are all directors created equal?
Reassessing the role 
of the chair in the 
light of ASIC v Rich
In 1963, on the steps of the Lincolnmemorial in Washington, DC, Martin LutherKing Jr made it known ‘that all men are
created equal’. Few people would argue with Dr
King’s philosophy but it would appear that
company directors might be an exception to
the rule. Indeed, equality in the boardroom is a
different matter altogether; a difference made
more palpable by the New South Wales
Supreme Court decision in ASIC v Rich on
24 February 2003.1
Equality in the boardroom: 
a legal fiction?
The role of company directors has been in the
international spotlight for some time now as a
result of numerous high profile corporate collapses.
Australia has not been alone in reconsidering its
position on corporate governance, through, for
example, the ASX’s Corporate Governance
Council, with the Higgs and Smith reviews in the
United Kingdom and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002
in the United States looking at similar issues.
Predominantly, discussion concerning the
chair of the board has revolved around issues of
independence, with less attention being given
to the legal responsibilities and accountabilities.
However, these critical concerns came to the
fore in the decision of Austin J in ASIC v Rich.
Before launching into an analysis of the case, it
is worth first observing where the chair fits into
the corporate governance framework, both from
a statutory and historical viewpoint.
The position of the chair
The position of chairperson is not sanctified
by any definition or mandatory provision in
the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). However, a
company’s constitution will most often either
adopt the replaceable rule in s 248E of the
Corporations Act, or contain a similar provision
permitting the board of directors to appoint a
director to chair their meetings. Beyond this,
precious little is typically said about the
chairman in the corporate constitution.2
You may have noticed that terms such as chair,
chairman, or chairperson can be used to describe
the position of chairing a company meeting. It is
worthy of note that s 18B of the Acts Interpretation
Act 1901 (Cth) deals specifically with the position
of chair, stating that:
Where an Act establishes an office of Chair of a
body, the Chair may be referred to as Chair,
Chairperson, Chairman, Chairwoman, or by any
other such term as the person occupying the office
so chooses.
So, too, in this paper, wherever possible I
have endeavoured to refer to the position in as
gender-neutral a fashion as possible, using the
expression chair.
The chair, by virtue of being a director, falls
within the definition of an officer contained
within s 9 of the Corporations Act, but not by
virtue of the chairmanship per se. Thus, the
chair, as a director, is subject to the duties and
responsibilities of a director, but there is little
by way of guidance as to the duties and
responsibilities peculiar to the position of the
chair itself. It is this lack of guidance that
makes the judgment of Austin J in ASIC v Rich
all the more interesting and important.
There has, however, been considerable
judicial and extra-judicial debate as to the role
of directors generally, and especially the
distinction between executive and non-
executive directors. Rogers C J, in AWA Ltd v
Daniels,3 sought to differentiate between the
duties owed by non-executive directors and
those owed by executive directors. However, on
appeal, this distinction was dismissed.4
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particularly that of non-executive
directors, remains very much a live
one. The recent major collapses
around the globe have ensured that
the role of directors remains squarely
in the spotlight. Subsequently,
multiple reviews and reports have
been ordered, legislation has been
passed, and much has been said
about the virtues of and necessity for
independent directors, the splitting
of the roles of chair and chief
executive, and the need for greater
accountability generally.
Notwithstanding all this debate,
the role and responsibilities of the
chair somehow retain a certain
mercurial quality, evading the
attention of judges and the prescripts
of legislation. In ASIC v Rich, Austin J
reviewed the last one hundred years
of case law vis-à-vis the role of the
chair and found that:
What emerges from these cases is that
the chairman has specific authority of
a procedural kind when chairing
meetings of directors or members.
These cases do not attribute to the
chairman any wider non-procedural
functions or responsibilities, but they
do not deny the possibility that wider
responsibilities might exist.5
It is arguable that the judgment of
Austin J is the most extensive review
to date of the legal responsibilities of
the chair and it highlights the need
for greater attention to the subject.
However, I believe that it does not go
so far as to definitively enunciate
what is expected of the chair of a
modern Australian public company.
ASIC v Rich: a summary
The case related to civil penalty
proceedings brought by the
Australian Securities and Investments
Commission (ASIC) against four
former directors of failed
telecommunications company
One.Tel Ltd: Jodee Rich, Bradley
Keeling, John Greaves and Mark
Silbermann. Mr Greaves was a non-
executive director. One.Tel also had
three other non-executive directors,
Lachlan Murdoch, James Packer, and
Rodney Adler, none of whom were a
party to the litigation.
Mr Greaves was chair of the board
and also of the Finance and Audit
Committee. The ruling of Austin J
relating to the duties and role of the
chair was the consequence of Mr
Greaves bringing an application to have
ASIC’s case against him summarily
dismissed on three grounds. The most
relevant of these was his claim that
ASIC had not disclosed a reasonable
cause of action, because the duties to
which ASIC alleged Mr Greaves was
subject were not known to law.
ASIC’s case was that each of the
four defendants contravened s 180(1)
of the Corporations Law (now
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)), which
holds that:
A director or other officer of a
corporation must exercise their powers
and discharge their duties with the
degree of care and diligence that a
reasonable person would exercise if they:
(a) were a director or officer of a
corporation in the corporation’s
circumstances; and
(b) occupied the office held by, and
had the same responsibilities within
the corporation as, the director or
officer. (emphasis added)
ASIC was seeking to prove that Mr
Greaves had:
special responsibilities beyond those
of the other non-executive directors,
by reason of his positions as chairman
of the board and the Finance and
Audit Committee, and also by reason
of his high qualifications, experience
and expertise relative to the other
directors.6
Therefore, ASIC submitted that, as
responsibilities for the purposes of
s 180(1), those special responsibilities
as a chair led to a higher standard of
requisite care and diligence, which
Mr Greaves failed to meet. ASIC
outlined the alleged responsibilities
in some depth, which were
summarised by Austin J as being
responsibilities with respect to:
• the general performance of the
board
• the flow of financial information
to the board (including
information about cash reserves,
actual segment performance and
key transactions)
• the establishment and
maintenance of systems for
information flow to the board
• the employment of a finance
director
• the public announcement of
information
• the maintenance of cash reserves
and group solvency and
• making recommendations to the
board as to prudent management
of the group.7
Thus, according to ASIC, the
statutory duty of care and diligence
(s 180(1)) led to the imposition upon
Mr Greaves, given the circumstances,
of a series of more specific duties,
each of which he failed to discharge.
It was argued by ASIC that the
specific duties arose because a
reasonable person, occupying Mr
Greaves’ positions and having the
same responsibilities (listed above) as
he had within the corporation,
would have acted, in the
corporation’s circumstances, with a
far greater degree of care and
diligence. In accordance with the
law, because the reasonable person
contemplated by s 180(1) would
have acted with such a degree of care
and diligence, Mr Greaves had
specific duties to do likewise.8
Mr Greaves’s argument to the
contrary was that he had no such
responsibilities, rather:
he was a non-executive director, in
essentially the same position as the
three other non-executive directors
who have not been sued by the
Commission, notwithstanding that he
was chairman of the board and of the
Finance and Audit Committee.9
In finding for ASIC, Austin J felt
comfortable with the fact that, while
there was no precedent that directly
attributed to the chair wider non-
procedural functions or
responsibilities, the precedents do
not deny the possibility that wider
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responsibilities might exist.10 Austin J
felt that ASIC had a ‘reasonably
arguable case for the view that Mr
Greaves had the responsibilities
pleaded’,11 adding that the United
Kingdom Higgs Review (released after
ASIC’s submissions were completed)
contained ‘emphatic statements
which appear to reinforce the
Commission’s evidence.’12
ASIC v Rich: a watershed, or
watered down?
Both the media and ASIC have
made much of the findings of Austin
J in ASIC v Rich, claiming it to be
something of a watershed or
landmark decision.13 It is possible to
view the decision in two ways and,
in turn, extract both a broad and a
narrow theoretical principle.
The broad principle, favoured by
the media, is that the judgment is in
fact a watershed decision that
exposes all chairs to a greater level of
accountability. The narrower, and
arguably more realistic, principle is
that the decision should largely be
confined to its facts and is only
applicable to chairs who are both
chair of the board and of the Finance
and Audit Committee, and who have
extensive financial and commercial
qualifications and experience.
When considering the decision in
context, there are two strong points
that lend weight to the narrower
principle.
Firstly, the proceedings themselves;
these were interlocutory proceedings,
seeking a summary dismissal of ASIC’s
civil penalty proceedings. Austin J has
merely accepted that ASIC’s
suggestions of expanded duties of
chairmen is ‘reasonably arguable’. To
date, there has been no finding
against Mr Greaves that he definitely
owed such duties, or that he was in
breach of them.
Secondly, Austin J makes it clear
that ASIC’s case was not about
establishing general principles of
accountability. At paragraph 18,
Austin J reminds us that:
The case that the Commission seeks to
make out is not a case about the
duties of a company chairman at
large, but about the duties of a
company chairman who is also
chairman of the audit committee,
having regard to the particular
circumstances of the company and his
special personal qualifications.
Lastly, it is worth remembering
that the proceedings may well go on
appeal. In light of these three
considerations, it can be concluded
that the decision in ASIC v Rich
certainly opens the door for a
widening of the duties of the chair
generally, but stops well short of
actually doing so. It can quite rightly
be confined to its facts and one
should be careful of reading too
much into the judgment of Austin J.
Rather, it is the outcome of the civil
penalty proceedings against Messrs
Rich, Silbermann and Greaves which
may be far more telling and
authoritative in terms of the role of
the company chair.
Corporate governance: ASIC
v Rich and a move towards
divergence
In 1999, following several years of
debate resulting in many countries
developing their own corporate
governance codes,14 two significant
attempts were made at enumerating
internationally acceptable principles
of corporate governance. The
Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD)
released its Principles of corporate
governance and the Commonwealth
Association for Corporate Governance
(CACG) unveiled its Principles of best
business practice for the Commonwealth.
At the time, these bodies sought to
capitalise on an apparent convergence
of thinking on corporate governance
and encouraged other countries to
follow suit.
However, since the collapse of
Enron in the United States, the
concept of international convergence
appears a little fragile. Where the
United States, the United Kingdom
and Australia could have been
grouped together once in terms of
corporate governance thinking, post-
Enron all three nations appear to be
taking divergent approaches in
reforming their corporate regulatory
environments.15
A similar divergence in relation to
Australia’s treatment of company
directors may be apparent in the
judgment of Austin J in ASIC v Rich.
By agreeing with the concept of
expanded duties of Mr Greaves as
chair, Austin J has implicitly agreed
with the idea of directors owing
different standards of duty when
they assume this additional position.
This would appear to fly in the face
of conventional common law and
legislative thinking. Indeed, ever
since the New South Wales Court of
Appeal overturned the first instance
findings of Rogers C J in AWA Ltd v
Daniels16, which sought to
differentiate between the duty owed
by non-executive directors and that
owed by executive directors, all
directors have been viewed as being
essentially equal in the eyes of the
law.17
However, even this equality has
only ever stretched so far. While it
was agreed that directors should be
subject to the same standard of duty,
the responsibilities of directors in
discharging their duties have been
less certain. In amending s 232(4) of
the old Corporations Law (the
predecessor to s 180(1) Corporations
Act), the Corporate Law Reform Bill
1992 (Cth) contained a shopping list
of matters (sub–s 4AA) it proposed a
court be required to consider for the
purpose of determining whether or
not a director had properly
discharged the statutory duties. This
list has been extensively critiqued
recently in Keeping good companies,18
and was seen as being a de facto list
of minimum responsibilities of
company directors.
The proposed subs 4AA was
abandoned when the Corporate Law
Reform Act 1992 (Cth) was passed.
However, its relevance was
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highlighted by Austin J in ASIC v
Rich, who saw some resonances
between it and ASIC’s submission as
to the responsibilities owed by Mr
Greaves.19 Interestingly, in accepting
ASIC’s submission to widen the
duties of the chair in question,
Austin J concurred with some of the
first instance observations of Rogers
C J in AWA Ltd v Daniels, namely
that ‘the chairman is responsible to a
greater extent than any other
director for the performance of the
board as a whole and each member
of it.’20 It is well known that the
decision of Rogers C J in AWA Ltd v
Daniels was overturned on appeal,
but Austin J claimed that ‘nothing
said by the Court of Appeal on
appeal from Rogers J’s
judgment…calls these observations
into question.’21
In ruling that it may be pertinent
for the responsibilities of the modern
chair to be widened in certain
circumstances, Austin J has proposed
a divergence from the concept of
equality between directors. Those
that take on the role of chair may be
faced with a greater standard of care,
which would be affected by the
corporation’s circumstances, the
nature of the director’s office, and
the director’s responsibilities. An
individual chair will find these
responsibilities will vary along a
sliding scale, taking into account any
arrangements flowing from the
qualifications, experience and skills
that the director brings to his or her
office, and also any arrangements
within the board or between the
director and executive management
affecting the work that the director
would be expected to carry out.22
Qualifications of the chair: a
new consideration in the light
of ASIC v Rich?
Everybody knows that directors of
public companies must be
appropriately qualified for the job.
This is the assumption.
Conventional layman’s thinking
suggests that no major company
would have a director on its board in
the absence of appropriate
qualifications and experience. Yet
these requisite qualifications are not
mandated by legislation or stock
exchange listing rules.
Sweeping requirements such as
those found in the Corporate
Governance Code adopted in
Singapore, stating that ‘every
company should be headed by an
effective Board to lead and control
the company’, are not uncommon,
but do little to require board
members to be qualified. The
guidance notes to the Singaporean
Code go further and propose that
every director should receive
appropriate training (in the duties of
a director and how to discharge these
duties) as soon as the director is
appointed to the board.23 Legislation,
such as Chapter 2D of Australia’s
Corporations Act, often goes to great
lengths to prescribe procedures for
appointing, remunerating and
terminating directors, and setting
minimum and maximum age limits,
but does not specifically require
directors to be qualified, provided
they can discharge their common
law, equitable and statutory duties.
Despite the lack of a legal
directive for qualified company
directors and officers, professional
bodies offer a range of educational
courses for Company Secretaries,
directors and the chair aimed at
certifying them as qualified for the
job, and aiding their understanding
of the compliance issues they face.
The number and variety of these
courses lends weight to the
commercial importance of directors
being appropriately trained, qualified
and up-to-date. This importance,
with particular reference to the chair
of the board, has been implicitly
highlighted by the judgment of
Austin J in ASIC v Rich and appears
to have some unexpected outcomes.
In ASIC v Rich, Mr Greaves’ high
qualifications were one of the key
factors that led to Austin J agreeing
to the widening of his duties as chair
of One.Tel. Thus, one might
reasonably extend this finding to
state, tentatively, that ASIC v Rich is
authority for the idea that the better
qualified chair may face higher
obligations at law than a chair with
fewer qualifications.
The ramifications of this reality
are not insignificant and beg several
questions. Will this decision act as a
disincentive, either to well-qualified
directors considering taking on the
position of chair or current well-
qualified chairs, to continue in the
role for fear of implications of these
higher duties? Is it now safer for
highly-qualified directors to stay as
‘ordinary’ directors, who are not
subject to the higher responsibilities
imposed upon the chair?
These questions put the chair of
the board in a difficult Catch-22
position: commercial practice
dictates that all directors should be
appropriately qualified, yet such
qualifications open the chair to a
greater level of responsibility. Hence,
these questions are not easy to
answer, particularly given the high
likelihood of ASIC v Rich going on
appeal.
In ruling that it may 
be pertinent for the
responsibilities of the
modern chair to be
widened in certain
circumstances, 
Austin J has proposed
a divergence from 
the concept of 
equality between
directors.
MAY 2003         KEEPING GOOD COMPANIES208
Company Secretary cont.
The role of the chair: a
final word
ASIC v Rich is only one of a
number of recent Australian cases
flowing from the collapses of One.Tel
and HIH Insurance. It is a decision
that has the potential to influence
the future direction taken by
corporate law in regulating the
conduct of members of the board. It
should be remembered, however,
that ASIC v Rich deals solely with the
chair, and only the chair of the
board who is also the chair of the
Finance and Audit Committee and
who has extensive qualifications and
experience. Thus, for the moment, it
can quite reasonably be confined to
its facts, although it is prudent to
reflect upon the role of the chair, as
Austin J has paved the way for
higher expectations in the future.
In the current litigious
atmosphere, fuelled by an eager
regulator and an investor community
baying for boardroom blood, all
directors are well-advised to keep
their noses clean and their houses in
order. One need only look to the
recent findings against Messrs Adler,
Williams and Fodera in ASIC v Adler24
to realise that breaches of directors’
duties under the Corporations Act
carry serious consequences and
heavy penalties. It must be
acknowledged that these proceedings
have been appealed by Messrs Adler
and Williams; however, at first
instance, the three directors were
found guilty of 182 breaches of their
statutory duties as directors.
In ASIC v Adler, the directors were
found to have breached, amongst
other things, s 180(1) of the
Corporations Act. Mr Adler was a non-
executive director of HIH Insurance,
Mr Williams was the Chief Executive
Officer, Mr Fodera was the finance
director. Notwithstanding their very
different roles within the company,
they were all subject to the same
duty of care and diligence.
Interestingly, Mr Greaves was also
charged with the same breach in
ASIC v Rich, however, his liability
arose as a result of his position as
chair, rather than just as a director. It
should be remembered, therefore,
that s 180(1) encompasses all
directors and officers of the
company, and the statutory
definitions of these positions are
very broad.
Despite the all-encompassing
nature of s 180(1), the jury is still out
in determining whether all directors
are equal in the eyes of the law.
Certainly, the judgment of Austin J
in ASIC v Rich reflects public
expectations and has fuelled the
debate with intelligent and
persuasive argument. The final
outcomes of any appeal arising from
this case, the actual civil penalty
proceedings against Messrs Rich,
Greaves and Silbermann, and the
impact (if any) of the recent
settlement between Bradley Keeling
and ASIC25 will all go towards
furthering discussion on the
differential treatment of the chair
and the board of directors. In
addition, possibly the most
important contribution to the debate
is to be found in Justice Neville
Owen’s report on the HIH Royal
Commission.
Without doubt, all directors
should maintain a watching brief in
order to monitor these key
developments. In particular, in light
of the decision in ASIC v Rich, chairs
should be reviewing their directors’
and officers’ insurance policies for
the relevant cover.
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